We consider anonymous games with a Lebesgue space of players in which either the action space or players' characteristics are denumerable. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies.
Introduction
Based on the work of Hildenbrand (1974) and Hart, Hildenbrand, and Kohlberg (1974) , Mas-Colell (1984) formulated the equilibrium notion of large anonymous games in terms of distributions. In this way, he departed from the usual formalization of an equilibrium as a strategy, i.e., as a measurable function from players into actions. This allowed him to obtain an existence theorem easily and under general conditions.
Since an equilibrium distribution is a probability distribution over characteristics and actions, it does not tell us what actions does each player takes in an equilibrium. Rather, and loosely, it tells us only the fraction of players with a certain characteristic that play a certain action. This is obviously in contrast with equilibrium strategies. Motivated by this, and despite the ease and generality that Mas-Colell's approach allows, researchers still investigate properties of equilibrium strategies (see the recent survey by Khan and Sun (2002) ).
It is clear that the two approaches are related. In the concrete case of a game described by a measurable function from players into characteristics (i.e., payoff functions), this function together with an equilibrium strategy induces an equilibrium distribution of the game. In particular, this observation implies that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions -defined as the set of marginal distributions over the space of actions obtained from the equilibrium distributions -contains the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies. It also implies that each theorem establishing the existence of an equilibrium strategy also establishes the existence of an equilibrium distribution. This potential for extra generality accounts for the attractiveness of posing the existence problem in anonymous games with a continuum of players in terms of distributions.
In fact, Mas-Colell's theorem relies on strictly weaker assumptions than those of the known results on the existence of equilibrium strategies in games defined on the unit interval, which are stated in Schmeidler (1973) , Rath (1992) , Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) . Despite this extra generality, is it the case that these existence theorems can be obtained as corollaries of Mas-Colell's? We show that, with the exception of Schmeidler's and Rath's theorems, Mas-Colell's implies all the others. We establish this relationship by showing that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies in denumerable games. Denumerable games are games with either a denumerable action space or with denumerably many characteristics. Hence, since Khan and Sun's theorem applies only to games with denumerably many actions, it is then implied by Mas-Colell's together with our main result.
Furthermore, we show, as corollaries to Mas-Colell's theorem, that an equilibrium distribution exists for any game in the class considered by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) .
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When the action space is denumerable, our main result then implies Theorems 1 to 3 of Kahn, Rath and Sun. More generally, it shows that an equilibrium strategy exists for all denumerable games in this 1 These are games in which each player's payoff depends only on his choice and on the average choice of the others and the action space is a (non-necessarily denumerable) subset of either a separable Banach space with the weak topology, a separable Banach space with the norm topology, a dual space of a separable Banach space with the weak* topology or R ∞ (in this last case, only games with countably many actions will be considered).
class.
An important consequence of our results is that it yields a general existence theorem for equilibrium strategies in games with an uncountable action space. Thus, in contrast to the view expressed in Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) , it is possible to extend the equilibrium theory for anonymous games beyond the case of denumerable action space. The extension we present requires, however, that players' characteristics be denumerable. Hence, our results stress the importance of denumerability assumptions for the existence of equilibrium strategies in games with a continuum of players, highlighted in Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) , but they show that those assumptions can be imposed either on the action space or on players' characteristics.
In fact, the examples of Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) show that our main result does not extent beyond denumerable games. In their examples, the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies is empty, while the set of equilibrium distributions over actions is not. It is this dependence on countability assumptions that prevents us from obtaining Schmeidler (1973) 's theorem on the existence of equilibrium strategies for games with a convex, compact subset of a euclidian space. It, therefore, also prevents us from obtaining Rath (1992) 's generalization of Schmeidler's theorem.
Besides extending Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) 's results by allowing uncountable action spaces in games with denumerably many characteristics, we find our approach to be conceptually simpler. It amounts simply to asking when we can obtain an equilibrium strategy from an equilibrium distribution, whose existence is guaranteed by Mas-Colell's Theorem. That is, we divide the existence question into two related ones: first, we ask when an equilibrium distribution might exist, the answer to which is given to us by Mas-Colell's theorem. Then, we ask if an equilibrium distribution over actions can be purified (or represented) by an equilibrium strategy. Our main result provides an answer to this question.
A recent and fruitful approach to the existence question in non-atomic games is the the one of Khan and Sun (1999) , who consider games on a Loeb space of players. Although we also find Mas-Colell's distributional approach simpler than theirs, because it relies exclusively on standard methods, it seems that Khan and Sun's approach allows for additional generality. In fact, Khan and Sun's Theorem 1 implies Mas-Colell's existence theorem.
However, it is unknown whether or not Mas-Colell's theorem implies Khan and Sun's. As noted by Khan and Sun (1999, p. 474) , Mas-Colell's theorem is equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium strategy in games on a hyperfinite Loeb counting space, but the argument that establishes this equivalence does not seem to extend to the case of a general Loeb space. Our approach can be useful in answering this question: If our main result holds in games on a Loeb space of players, then the equivalence between Mas-Colell's and Khan and Sun's theorems would be established.
Apart from the question of additional generality, Mas-Colell's theorem is also useful to relate several known existence results. In addition to the ones we have already mentioned, we have shown in Carmona (2005) that Mas-Colell's theorem is equivalent to the existence of an approximate equilibrium in all sufficiently large equicontinuous games (i.e., games in which players' characteristics form an equicontinuous family).
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These relations are
2 There, we also show that both these results are equivalent to Khan and Sun (1999) 's summarized in Figure 1 .
We conclude this section with a remark on the proofs of our results.
Although different, our approach in games with denumerably many actions is, nevertheless, quite close to the one used by Khan and Sun (1995) . Here, as there, the main tool is the Bollobás and Varopoulos's Theorem. Thus, our approach relies on their insight into the importance of this theorem for the theory of large games. The results regarding games with denumerably many characteristics are new and rely on a simple modification of Skorokhod's Theorem (see Skorokhod (1956) ).
Notation and Definitions
Let A be a non-empty, complete and separable metric space of actions en- game G has denumerably many actions if A is denumerable. Finally, a game is denumerable if it has either denumerably many actions or characteristics.
Let U c denote the space of continuous utility functions u : A×M(A) → R endowed with the supremum norm; it is a complete, separable metric space.
A game G is continuous if A is compact and U = U c .
Given a Borel probability measure τ on U × A, we denote by τ U and τ A the marginals of τ on U and A respectively. The expression
Given a game G with a continuum of players, a Borel probability measure
, and
We will use the following notation:
For a general game G with a continuum of players, an implicit requirement for τ to be an equilibrium distribution is that B τ is measurable.
Note that if G is continuous, then B τ is closed, and so a Borel set; hence
A pure strategy is a measurable function f :
Mas-Colell (1984)'s Theorem 1 asserts the existence of an equilibrium distribution in games with a continuum of players.
Theorem 1 (Mas-Colell) An equilibrium distribution exists for all continuous games.
In the following sections, we will show how Theorem 1 implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium in continuous, denumerable games.
Denumerable Games
In this section, we present our main result. Let G be a game with a continuum of players and let D(G) be the set of equilibrium distributions over actions.
Formally,
Also, let D(G) be the set of distributions over actions induced by equilibrium strategies:
: f is a Nash equilibrium of G}.
It is clear that for any game G, denumerable or not, we have that D(G) ⊆ D(G). This follows simply from the fact that if f is a Nash equilibrium of
, then τ A belongs to D(G). In general, the inclusion is strict as it can be seen from the first example in Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) . However, if G is denumerable, then they coincide.
Theorem 2 If G is a denumerable game, then D(G) = D(G).
Theorem 2 follows from Theorems 3 and 4 below. We can interpret it as showing that for denumerable games there is no loss of generality by focusing on equilibrium strategies. That is, all equilibrium behavior is captured by equilibrium strategies.
Although interesting in its own right, Theorem 2 has an important consequence when applied to continuous games. If G is a continuous game, then, by Mas-Colell (1984, Theorem 1), G has an equilibrium distribution τ .
and f is a Nash equilibrium of G. Therefore, G has a Nash equilibrium. Thus, Theorem 2 implies the existence of Nash equilibria for continuous, denumerable games with a continuum of players.
Corollary 1 A Nash equilibrium exists for all continuous, denumerable games.
Games with Denumerably Many Actions
In this subsection we consider games with denumerable action spaces. The following purification result establishes part of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 Let G be a game with denumerably many actions. If τ is an equilibrium distribution of G, then there exists a Nash equilibrium
The idea of the proof is to partition the set of players into as many sets as the number of actions available and then use this partition (which is in a one-to-one correspondence with the action space) to define the equilibrium strategy. This partition must satisfy two properties: the set of players playing action a must be a subset of those for whom a is a best-reply and its measure must equal τ A ({a}). The existence of such partition is guaranteed by the Bollobás and Varopoulos's theorem as stated in Khan and Sun (1995) . 
Games with Denumerably Many Characteristics
Finally, we turn to games with denumerably many characteristics. For games in this class, we obtain a stronger representation theorem.
Theorem 4 Let G be a game with denumerably many characteristics. If τ is an equilibrium distribution of G, then there exists a Nash equilibrium
Clearly, Theorem 4 implies the remaining part of Theorem 2, but it says more: for games with denumerably many characteristics, the set of equilibrium distributions coincides with the set of distributions induced by Nash equilibria and the function U describing the game.
The idea of its proof is simple: we define as many probability measures over the action space as the number of possible characteristics. Each such measure describes the distribution of choices made by players with a given characteristic. A modified version of Skorokhod (1956) 's theorem allows us to represent any such measure by a function defined on the set of players with the corresponding characteristic. Then, it is easy to see that these functions define the equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 4 implies part of Corollary 1. That is, it implies that any continuous game with denumerably many characteristics has a Nash equilibrium.
We emphasize that for this result, the action space can be uncountable. In this way, it is the first result on the existence of an equilibrium strategy when the action space is just a compact metric space.
Games based on the Average of Individual Choices 4.1 Bochner Integral with the Weak Topology
In this subsection, assume that A is a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach space X. Let co(A) denote the closed convex hull of A, which is also weakly compact (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Theorem 11, p. 51) ). It follows from Dunford and Schwartz (1957, Theorem V.6.3, p. 434 
) that both
A and co(A) are metrizable. Note that the identity function i : A → A is µ -Bochner integrable and that A idµ belongs to co(A) for every µ ∈ M(A).
Finally, let U w be the space of weakly continuous real-valued functions on A × co(A) endowed with the sup norm.
We define a class G w of games with a continuum of players as follows:
An equilibrium distribution for G ∈ G w is a Borel probability measure τ
where the integral A idτ A is a Bochner integral. A pure strategy f is a Nash equilibrium of G if
As a consequence of Mas-Colell's theorem and of Theorem 2, we obtain the following existence result.
Corollary 3 An equilibrium distribution exists for all games G ∈ G w . Furthermore, if G is denumerable, then a Nash equilibrium exists.
Note that when G is a game with denumerably many actions, Corollary 3 corresponds to Theorem 2 by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) .
Bochner Integral with the Norm Topology
In this subsection, assume that A is a norm compact of a separable Banach space B. Then, co(A) is also norm compact (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Theorem 12, p. 51)). We let U n be the space of norm continuous real-valued functions on A × co(A) endowed with the sup norm.
Finally, we let G n be the class of games defined as in Subsection 4.1, except that now players' payoff functions belong to U n (and A is norm compact).
As in Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) , Corollary 3 also applies to the case of norm compact action spaces. Note that A is weakly compact. Thus, since norm continuous functions on norm compact sets are weakly continuous, we obtain the following existence result.
Corollary 4 An equilibrium distribution exists for all games
G ∈ G n . Fur- thermore, if G is denumerable,
then a Nash equilibrium exists.
Similarly to what happened in the previous section, Corollary 4 corresponds to Corollary 1 by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) when G is a game with denumerably many actions.
Gel'fand Integral
In this subsection, let X * be the dual of a separable Banach space X and assume that A is a weak* compact subset of X * . Then, co(A) is also weak* compact. It follows from Rudin (1971, Theorem 3.16, p. 70 ) that both A and co(A) are metrizable. Note that the identity function i : A → A is µ -
Gel'fand integrable and that A idµ belongs to co(A) for every µ ∈ M(A).
Finally, let U g be the space of weak* continuous real-valued functions on A × co(A) endowed with the sup norm.
We define a class G g of games with a continuum of players as follows:
An equilibrium distribution for G ∈ G g is a Borel probability measure τ
where the integral A idτ A is a Gel'fand integral. A pure strategy f is a Nash equilibrium of G if
For games in this class, we also have the following existence result.
Corollary 5 An equilibrium distribution exists for all games G ∈ G g . Furthermore, if G is denumerable, then a Nash equilibrium exists.
Corollary 5 corresponds to Theorem 3 by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) when G is a game with denumerably many actions.
Games with Denumerably Many Actions in R ∞
In this subsection we consider the class of games defined in Section 5 of Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) . Let R We define a class G ∞ of games with a continuum of players as follows:
The following definitions are from Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) . If (T, T , ν) is a probability space, then a function f :
T . In this case,
and so we trivially obtain the following change of variable formula:
Furthermore, if j ∈ N and π j : R ∞ → R is the projection onto the j th coordinate, then π j is a simple function and its Lebesgue integral is A π j dµ = µ({e j }).
An equilibrium distribution for G ∈ G ∞ is a Borel probability measure τ
A pure strategy f is a Nash equilibrium of G if
Using both Corollary 1 and Mas-Colell's theorem, we can provide an alternative proof of Theorem 1 by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) .
Corollary 6 (Kahn, Rath and Sun) A Nash equilibrium exists for all games
G ∈ G ∞ .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we focus on three aspects of the theory of anonymous games with a continuum of players:
1. The relationship between the set of equilibrium distributions over actions and the set of distributions induced by Nash equilibria, 2. the existence of Nash equilibria in games with a compact action space and 3. the place of Mas-Colell's theorem in this theory.
Regarding the first issue, our main result (Theorem 2) shows that the two sets are equal in denumerable games. This implies that there is no gain in considering distributions for analyzing such games; in fact, equilibrium behavior is completely described by Nash equilibrium strategies.
Combining our main result with Mas-Colell's theorem, we obtain the existence of a Nash equilibrium strategy in continuous, denumerable games (Corollary 1). In particular, Corollary 1 yields, to the best of our knowledge, the first general existence theorem for large games with an arbitrarily compact metric space of actions.
We emphasize that our existence result, as well as those by Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) , follows directly from Mas-Colell's. This gives Mas-Colell's theorem a central place in the equilibrium theory of large games.
The importance of Mas-Colell's result is also highlighted by its unifying role. In fact, it allows us to relate many of the known results on the equi-librium theory of anonymous games, including both the cases of non-atomic and large finite games (see Figure 1) .
We stress that two existence results are missing in Figure 1 : those of Schmeidler (1973) and Rath (1992) for games defined on the unit interval.
While it is clear that Rath's theorem implies Schmeidler's, it is unknown to us how each of them relates to the others listed in Figure 1 , which is why they have been omitted the figure. It is also unknown whether Mas-Colell's theorem is equivalent to Kahn and Sun's on the existence of an equilibrium strategy in games on a general Loeb space. These are the main questions that this paper leaves open.
These questions can, however, be addressed as we did in this paper: we can ask whether the set of equilibrium distributions (denoted by D(G)) is equal to the set of distributions induced by Nash equilibria (denoted by D(G)) in the class of games considered by Schmeidler (1973) , Rath (1992) and Khan and Sun (1999) . Actually, in the case of the first two, we can simply ask whether the set
}. An affirmative answer to either one of these questions would imply that those results are also a corollary of Mas-Colell's.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Let G be a game with denumerably many actions and τ be an equilibrium distribution of G. Note first that
for all measurable subsets C of U × A. This follows because τ (B τ ) = 1.
. For all i ∈ N define
and
Since the set {u ∈ U : (u, a i ) ∈ B τ } is measurable (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 4.45, p. 148) ), it follows that so is T i for all i ∈ N.
Let I be a finite subset of N. Then,
it follows that
Hence, by the Theorem of Bollobás and Varopoulos (see Khan and Sun (1995, Theorem 4)), there exists a pairwise disjoint family
Finally, we show that f is a Nash equilibrium. Let i ∈ N and t ∈ S i .
We have that f (t) = a i and λ • f
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Let G a be game with denumerably many characteristics and τ be an equilibrium distribution of G. We claim that there exists a measurable function
The proof of the above claim is as follows:
and so f is measurable.
Let B be a measurable subset of U × A and define
(2) 3 The existence of such f i can be obtained by appropriately modifying the proof of Skorokhod (1956, Theorem 3.1.1, p. 281) . We need only to redefine the sets ∆ i 1 ,...,i k , which will be of the form T i intersected with an interval. The continuity of the functions
To finish the argument, we claim that f is a Nash equilibrium of G. For notational convenience let h = (U, f ). We have
)}) = 1. Thus, f is a Nash equilibrium.
A.3 Lemmata for Corollary 3
In this subsection X denotes a separable Banach space and A a weakly compact subset of X. If a sequence {x k } ∞ k=1 converges to x in X with respect to the weak topology, we write x k → w x. If µ ∈ M(A) and (T, T , ν) is a measure space, in order to avoid any confusion, we say that a function f : T → X is strongly µ -measurable when f is µ -measurable as defined in Diestel and Uhl (1977) .
Lemma 1 Let A be a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach space and µ ∈ M(A). Then, the identity function i : A → A is µ -Bochner integrable
and A idµ ∈ co(A).
Proof. Let k ∈ N. Since X is separable, there exists a countable set
The last fact follows since if
Furthermore, since A is bounded, let M be such that ||x|| ≤ M for all x ∈ A. Thus, A ||i||dµ ≤ M < ∞. This implies that i is Bochner integrable by Diestel and Uhl (1977, Theorem 2, p. 45 ).
Finally, A idµ ∈ co(A) by Diestel and Uhl (1977, Corollary 8, p. 48) .
Lemma 2 Let A be a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach space and
Proof. Let Λ ∈ X * . Then, Λ : X → R is weakly continuous and so Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 11.44, p. 420) (which is a particular case of Hille's Theorem stated in Diestel and Uhl (1977, Theorem 6, p. 47) ), it follows that
Thus, A idµ k converges weakly to A idµ.
Lemma 3 Let A be a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach space and x ∈ co(A). Then, there exists µ ∈ M(A) such that x = A idµ.
Proof. Let x ∈ co(A) = co(A) (by Dunford and Schwartz (1957, Lemma V.2.4 (ii), p. 415)) and let
λ j x j for some {x j } ⊆ A and {λ j } j with λ j ≥ 0 and
Proof. Consider first the case in which g is simple and
We turn to the general case. Since g is λ • f 
. Thus, ||g n • f − g • f || → 0 almost everywhere, and since
Furthermore, since A is bounded, then ||g n •f −g•f || is also bounded, and it follows from the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem that [0, 1] 
-Bochner integrable and
Furthermore,
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3
Let W : U w → U c be defined by
for all x ∈ A and µ ∈ M(A). Since, by Lemma 1, i is µ -Bochner integrable and A idµ ∈ co(A) for all µ, then W is well defined. Furthermore, by Lemma 2, W (u) ∈ U c .
Lemma 5
The function W is injective and continuous. v(x, z) .
We next show that W is continuous. Let u ∈ U w and {u k } k ⊆ U w be such
and so
so W is continuous. Since W is injective, define g :
.
Lemma 6 The function g is continuous and V
z ∈ co(A) be given and let µ ∈ M(A) be such that z = A idµ. Then,
and so ||g( (v) and so g is continuous.
Let
• W equals the identity
We state the following lemma for later use.
Lemma 7 For all Borel subsets
Proof. Note first that
Hence,
for all Borel subsets B of U w × A.
since for all Borel measurable subsets B ⊆ U w we have that
Furthermore, µ A = τ A since for all Borel measurable subsets B of A we have that
Finally, we claim that
If, in addition, G is denumerable, then G V is also denumerable. Hence, by Corollary 1, there exists a Nash equilibrium f .
Therefore,
for all a ∈ A and t ∈ [0, 1], and
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, f is a Nash equilibrium of G.
A.5 Lemmata for Corollary 5
In this subsection X denotes a 
Lemma 8 Let µ ∈ M(A). Then, the identity function
i : A → A is µ -
Gel'fand integrable and A idµ ∈ co(A).
Proof. Note first that i is weak* measurable. This follows because for all x ∈ X, the function xi : A → R defined by xi(a) = a(x) is measurable since it is weak* continuous. Furthermore, i is Gel'fand integrable by Aliprantis and Border (1999, 11.51, p.424) : since xi is weak* continuous on a weak* compact set, then there exists M ∈ R such that ||xi(a)|| ≤ B for all a ∈ A, which in turn implies that xi is integrable for all x ∈ X.
Finally, A idµ ∈ co(A) by Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 11.53, p. 424) . 
Lemma 10 can be proven in the same way as Lemma 3.
Lemma 11 Let f : [0, 1] → A be measurable and g : A → A be continuous.
Then,
Proof. Note first that for all x ∈ X we have that (xg) • f = x(g • f ).
Since xg : A → R is continuous and f is measurable, this implies that x(g •f )
is measurable for all x ∈ X. Hence, g • f is weak* -measurable. 
A.6 Proof of Corollary 5
The proof of Corollary 5 follows the same scheme used in the proof of Corollary 3. Lemmata 8 -11 imply that all the claims in the proof of Corollary 3 extend to the current setting.
A.7 Lemmata for Corollary 6 Lemma 12 Let µ ∈ M(A). If {µ
Proof. Let j ∈ N. Since π j is continuous, then
Since the j Lemma 13 can be proven in the same way as Lemma 3.
A.8 Proof of Corollary 6
The proof of Corollary 6 follows the same scheme used in the proof of Corollary 3. Again we let W : U ∞ → U c be defined by W (u)(a, µ) = u a, 
it follows that U (t) f (t), [0, 1] f dλ ≥ U (t) A, [0, 1] f dλ for almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, f is a Nash equilibrium of G. With the exception of Mas-Colell's (MC), all these results establish the existence of Nash equilibria. In all of them, action spaces are compact metric spaces and payoff functions are continuous. The symbol dist stands for games in which the externality is modeled as a distribution, while av is for those in which it is modeled as an average. The symbol c stands for counting, den for denumerable games and eqc for equicontinuous games. Finally, C stands for this paper and for Carmona (2005) , KS for Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan and Sun (1999) and KRS for Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) .
